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“To draw attention today to technological
affairs is to focus on a concern that is as central
now as nation building and constitution making
were a century ago. Technological affairs con-
tain a rich texture of technical matters, scientific
laws, economic principles, political forces, and
social concerns.”
—Thomas P. Hughes, 1983
The American electric utility system has
been massively transformed during the last three
decades. Viewed previously as a staid, secure,
and heavily regulated natural monopoly, the sys-
tem has shed elements of government oversight
and now appears to be increasingly susceptible
to terrorist attacks and other disruptions.
Overturning the conventional wisdom of the
1960s and 1970s, dependence on large-scale
generation plants and high-voltage transmission
networks now seems to decrease reliability of
the system. The same hardware also subjects
utility companies to pollution concerns at a time
when environmental sustainability has become a
serious political and economic issue worldwide.
Clearly, much of the formerly sound thinking
about the utility system has been overturned.
But new thinking has evolved as well. For exam-
ple, many people have begun advocating the use
of small-scale, decentralized technologies
known collectively as distributed generation
(DG), which offers hope that the electric utility
system may become more resilient and environ-
mentally friendly in the near future.
This article examines the reversal of almost
a century of momentum in the electric utility
system. To do so, it employs the nonengineering
version of the systems approach, which has
proven useful for analyzing sociotechnical enter-
prises. As a subtheme, the article explores long-
term and cross-industry trends in the use of
technologies; in particular, it notes that industri-
al use of large-scale technologies, which provide
great economies of scale, may have reached lim-
its in certain fields, such that small-scale tech-
nologies may have become better suited for use.
As another subtheme, the article underscores the
importance of nontechnical (i.e., social) action
in the development of technologies. In the
American utility system, the unintended conse-
quences of an obscure law passed in 1978
spurred deregulatory efforts in the 1990s and the
development of commercially viable renewable
energy and distributed generation technologies.
The encouragement of these environmentally
preferable and DG facilities continued during
the political chaos that emerged early in the
twenty-first century, when utility restructuring
became questioned in many states.
Using the Systems Approach to
Understand Technological Change
To help understand the historical develop-
ment of electric utilities, one can fruitfully use
the “systems approach” that Thomas Hughes
originally developed for the social sciences. In
his seminal Networks of Power: Electrification
in Western Society (Hughes 1983) and other
works, Hughes argues that the generation, trans-
mission and distribution of electricity occurs
within a technological system. That system
extends beyond the engineering realm, and it
includes a “seamless web” of considerations that
can be categorized as economic, educational,
legal, administrative, and technical. Large mod-
ern systems integrate these elements into one
piece, with system-builders striving to “con-
struct or ... force unity from diversity, centraliza-
tion in the face of pluralism, and coherence
from chaos” (Hughes 1987, 52). If the managers
succeed, the system expands and thrives while,
simultaneously, closing itself. In other words,
the influence on it of the outside environment
may gradually recede because the system has
expanded its reach to encompass factors that
might otherwise alter it (Hughes 1987, 52).
Hughes’s systems approach also employs
the notion of momentum, which Networks of
Power describes as a mass of “machines,
devices, structures” and “business concerns,
government agencies, professional societies,
educational institutions and other organizations”
that “have a perceptible rate of growth or veloci-
ty” (Hughes 1983, 15). In fewer words, Hughes
defines momentum elsewhere as a “mass of
technological, organizational and attitudinal
components [that tend] to maintain their steady
growth and direction” (Hughes 1989, 460). The
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system’s tendency to continue along a given path
results from the actions of numerous stakehold-
ers, such as educational and regulatory institu-
tions, the investment of billions of dollars in
equipment, and the work and culture of people
working within an industry. In concert, these
elements promote business as usual and the out-
ward show of a large degree of momentum.
Furthermore, Hughes explains that system
momentum can be aided through the use of
“conservative” inventions, i.e., new technologies
that preserve the existing system. Managers of
the system obviously prefer to maintain their
control of affairs and, while they may seek
increased efficiencies and profits, they do not
want to see introduction of new and disruptive
“radical” technologies. As an example, Internet
telephony and cell phones may be viewed today
as radical inventions by managers of the tradi-
tional wired communications network.
To summarize, Hughes’s approach suggests
that systems develop through human managers’
control of elements to exploit the existing social
environment. Systems acquire momentum, and
they resist alteration as they mature.
Momentum, however, is not the equivalent of
determinism (which holds that either social or
technical factors are exclusively responsible for
technological development) or autonomy (which
suggests that technologies achieve a level of
action independent of human contexts). Rather,
momentum in systems—even those having high
momentum—can sometimes be altered through
“a confluence of contingency, catastrophe and
conversion,” as Hughes puts it (1989, 470-471).
Through their institutions and actions, humans
may play a role in changing momentum, diffi-
cult as that may appear in many situations. But
such was the case in the American electric utili-
ty system.
Origins and Growth of Momentum in
the Electric Utility System
The electric utility system began to gain
momentum early in the twentieth century. It did
so largely as power company managers took
advantage of incrementally improving technolo-
gy. Adopting alternating-current (AC) transmis-
sion and steam-turbine technologies, early utility
entrepreneurs quickly found they could emulate
trends in other industries, most notably by
increasing the scale of their business. Economist
Alfred Chandler (1977) has shown how the rail-
road industry served as the epitome of modern
enterprises that exploited new technologies to
expand their scale and scope. In the process,
railroad companies eliminated regional competi-
tion and gained panoptic political and economic
power, while also earning the contempt of many
of their customers. Similarly, through the use of
transformers made available in the late 1880s,
AC transmission allowed companies to distrib-
ute high-voltage power over long distances. And
in the first decade of the twentieth century, utili-
ty managers began employing compact steam
turbines (connected to generators) as prime
movers that further encouraged centralization,
because the new machines offered tremendous
economies of scale. Put simply, as the turbines
produced larger capacities of power, the unit
cost of electricity declined over a wide range of
output. Taking actions that would be imitated by
other electrical entrepreneurs, Samuel Insull
embraced alternating current and steam turbines
for his small Chicago Edison Company. When
he took over the firm in 1892, Chicago claimed
20 competitive electric supply firms. By 1907,
Insull employed the new technology and consol-
idated them into the renamed “Commonwealth
Edison Company,” a virtual monopoly in the
city and its environs (Hughes 1983, 208).
Steam turbine-generators and alternating-
current technologies became the core conserva-
tive technologies of the utility system, allowing
it to produce increasing amounts of power at
lower unit cost. Developed for utility use by
companies such as Westinghouse and General
Electric, the technology showed improvements
mainly in two criteria. First, manufacturers
designed steam turbines using new metal alloys
that could endure higher temperatures and pres-
sures, thus yielding better thermal efficiencies.
While Thomas Edison’s pioneering 1882 power
station (which used reciprocating steam engines)
converted just 2.5 percent of a raw fuel’s energy
into electricity, steam turbines improved over the
years to achieve a conversion efficiency of about
40 percent in the 1960s, though the average
plant demonstrated an efficiency of about 33
percent (Figure 1). At the same time, manufac-
turers exploited new knowledge about metallur-
gy to produce turbines and generators that
became ever-larger and took advantage of
economies of scale. Following installation of a
5-megawatt (MW) steam turbine in 1905, for
example, Samuel Insull’s firm procured 12-MW
machines in 1911 (Insull 1915, 430). More pow-
erful equipment followed: Insull’s company
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employed a 208-MW unit in 1929. After the
Great Depression, other American utilities
bought units that reached 1,000 MW in 1965
and 1,300 MW in 1972.
The growth in scale of electric utility tech-
nology parallels trends in other industries. As in
the manufacturing of automobiles and consumer
durables and in service industries and sanitation,
managers employed technologies that reduced
unit costs, increased efficiency, and added to
profitability as the scale of operations increased
(Melosi 2000; Noble 1999). Some of the scale
efficiency occurred for “simple” laws of mathe-
matics and engineering. For example, as the cir-
cumference of a pipe that feeds a steam turbine
increases by a factor of three, the volume of
steam passing through it increases by a factor of
nine. In other words, for a modest increase in
material inputs (and costs), the industrialist
obtains disproportionately large outputs (Hirsh
1989, 41). More gains emerge when realizing
that many other costs decline as scale increases.
Instead of employing two small steam turbines,
along with the associated equipment and person-
nel needed to operate them, a utility could build
one large turbine. The power output is equiva-
lent, but at lower unit cost.
Because of associated improvements in
transmission, distribution, and control equip-
ment, the use of more fuel-efficient and larger
turbine-generators boosted the industry’s total
factor productivity—a measure of overall oper-
ating efficiency (Kendrick 1961; Kendrick
1973). In everyday terms, higher productivity
meant declining costs and prices. While residen-
tial customers in 1892 paid about 544 cents per
kilowatt-hour (kWh) (in adjusted 2004 terms),
they only paid 10 cents for the equivalent
amount of electricity in 1970 (Edison Electric
Institute 1988; Edison Electric Institute 1997;
U.S. Department of Energy 2005a). Since lower
prices and the availability of attractive electrical
appliances stimulated demand, consumption
jumped at a 12 percent annual growth rate from
1900 to 1920 and at a 7 percent average annual
rate from 1920 to 1973 (Landsberg and Schurr
1968).
While the use of conservative, incremental-
ly improving technologies contributed to the
utility system’s growing momentum, so did non-
technical elements. By focusing attention on
such elements, Hughes’s system approach helps
us understand that technology evolves in a social
milieu. Perhaps most surprisingly, the creation
of regulatory oversight of the utility industry
contributed significantly to momentum. As aca-
demics and politicians began to realize during
the Progressive era in American politics, which
lasted from about 1896 to the beginning of
World War I, certain types of businesses
appeared unable to operate within the traditional
competitive market environment: they required
construction of capital-intensive facilities that
limited the number of rivals to those few that
could secure financing. Meanwhile, competition
among firms had already led to political corrup-
tion in attempts to win franchise rights from city
leaders. These businesses, such as railroads and
the increasingly large electric power companies,
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Figure 1.  Data from Edison Electric Institute 1988, Electric Light and Power, and
U.S. Department of Energy 2004.
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constituted “natural monopolies”—businesses
that offered services most efficiently and cheap-
ly only if they remained free from competition
(Hirsh 1999, 17-18). Regulation became viewed
as a popular approach for gaining the benefits of
large-scale companies while protecting the pub-
lic from potential abuses. In other words, the
existence of natural monopolies seemed to call
for the regulatory commission as a new, socially
valuable institution.
While casual observers might assume that
industrial tycoons would resist government regu-
lation, Samuel Insull and other prescient man-
agers realized that regulation actually could help
them to consolidate a fledgling industry. As
early as 1898, Insull argued that government
oversight would confer legitimacy to power
companies as natural monopolies and, as impor-
tant, it would enable utilities to reduce their cost
of financing by lessening the risk incurred by
investors. Regulation would also protect utilities
from attempts at municipal takeovers (Insull
1915, 34).
Government oversight of utilities added to
system momentum, ironically by giving utility
managers a large measure of control. Because
regulators guaranteed an almost certain income
stream and financial viability, utilities benefited.
Moreover, regulation offered the appearance of
watchful supervision without really providing
much, thereby providing a large degree of clout
to utility managers. With the end of the
Progressive era, state regulators received little
attention from the news media or state legisla-
tors, which provided few resources to combat
the utilities’ well-paid lawyers and consultants.
Meanwhile, utility managers courted regulators,
and they publicly exaggerated the positive role
that regulators played in maintaining a success-
ful large-scale enterprise. Regulators did little to
disabuse the public of this notion. They happily
went along with the charade because they
enjoyed the little prestige and power they
acquired by being associated with an industry
that provided declining prices for an increasing-
ly necessary commodity (Hirsh 1999, 41-46). In
short, utility managers had “captured” the regu-
latory apparatus, which contributed to their con-
trol of a system that had developed growing
momentum (Stigler 1971; McCraw 1984).
Beyond regulators, utility managers won the
support of other stakeholders who sought to
keep the system moving in the same direction
and with continuously increasing mass and
velocity. Investment bankers constituted one
supportive party as they profited from supplying
money for the capital-intensive industry. They
also helped create holding companies, which
offered power company managers access to
financial resources and professional manage-
ment expertise. Manufacturers of electrical
equipment further contributed to momentum
because they flourished monetarily when utility
companies expanded and required more
advanced technologies. To train utility execu-
tives and middle-managers, educational institu-
tions (starting with MIT and Cornell University)
fashioned degree programs for electrical engi-
neers and also became tacit contributors of
momentum. Utility customers, meanwhile,
appeared happy, as electrification benefited peo-
ple with higher material standards of living and
a sense of social progress (Hirsh 1989, 26-35).
They did little to impede the growing momen-
tum and, through their increasing purchases of
electricity, added to it.
By the 1920s (and continuing into the
1960s), the utility system had gained a huge
amount of momentum. Serving as an integral
part of the infrastructure that enhanced industri-
al productivity and made the “good life” possi-
ble, the system employed incrementally improv-
ing and conservative technologies. Moreover,
utility managers gained control of the system by
capturing the regulatory framework and by win-
ning support from financial, industrial, educa-
tional, and consumer stakeholders—all of whom
seemed to reap tangible benefits (Hirsh and
Serchuk, 1996). On the surface, it appeared that
little could alter the system’s trajectory.
Momentum Change Begins
The first challenge to continuously building
momentum in the electric utility system arose in
the 1960s and 1970s. In a process that has been
called “technological stasis,” the industry wit-
nessed the apparent end of productivity-enhancing
technological improvements. For a host of mana-
gerial and technical reasons, the thermal efficien-
cy of steam turbine-generators stopped improving.
Though some plants reached efficiencies as high
at 40 percent, they also proved to be highly unreli-
able, which made them unattractive to managers
who sought to keep plants online as long as possi-
ble. As bad experience grew with these highly
efficient plants, managers stopped ordering them,
remaining satisfied with the less-efficient, but
more trustworthy units (Hirsh 1989, 89).
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Soon thereafter, technological stasis
occurred again, this time as utilities sought to
build ever-larger, higher-capacity power plants.
As units grew to exceed 1,000 MW in the 1960s
and 1970s, utilities also discovered operational
problems as turbine blades suffered distortions
and as furnace problems and other defects ham-
pered the units’ performance (Figure 2). Despite
the desire to attain increased economies of scale,
especially in light of the industry’s inability to
reach higher thermal efficiencies, managers
stepped back from the largest units and settled
for smaller, proven units. The problem became
increasingly serious in light of the 1973 “energy
crisis,” which caused fuel to become more
expensive. In previous decades, the improve-
ment of power-producing technologies had miti-
gated increased costs in building materials and
labor, allowing the industry to reduce the price
of its product. But because of technological sta-
sis—along with greatly increased borrowing
rates for an industry that consumed vast
amounts of capital—power companies soon
found themselves uncharacteristically requesting
rate hikes from utility commissions (Hirsh 1989,
111). Additionally, the higher prices created
antipathy among customers who previously sup-
ported the structure of the utility system. More
tangibly, higher prices motivated customers to
purchase less power: for a few years after the
onset of the crisis, electricity consumption actu-
ally grew at negative rates, while the longer term
annual growth rate (from 1973 to 2003) dropped
to about 2.4 percent (Figure 3).
Politics and System Momentum
The havoc on the American economy
wreaked by the energy crisis spurred policy
makers to take action. On the federal level,
President Carter made energy policy his first
major initiative. Among a set of five laws pro-
posed by Carter and passed by Congress (albeit
in greatly diluted form), the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 had
the most far-reaching—and least intended—con-
sequences for power companies. It spurred cre-
ation of radical technologies; it began the
process of deregulation; and it challenged the
control held by power company managers. In the
process, the law helped change the momentum
of the utility system.
Superficially, PURPA appeared to pose little
threat to utility companies. But one obscure por-
tion of it offered incentives for the use of effi-
cient cogeneration power plants. These small
units often produced less than 100 MW of
power—about 10 percent of what utility-owned
nuclear and fossil units churned out—and they
burned coal, natural gas, garbage, or biomass.
The resulting heat first produced electricity
using a traditional steam turbine. But instead of
dumping the low-pressure steam into the envi-
ronment, as was common practice for utility
power plants, cogenerators employed it for
industrial processes. In other words, small
cogeneration plants obtained double duty from
raw fuel in the form of two valuable products
(electricity and process steam), yielding an 
Figure 2.  Data from U.S. Department of Energy 2003.
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overall thermal efficiency rate of 50 percent or
higher. (Compare this figure to the 40 percent
optimum achieved by utility power plants.)
Because of this feat, cogeneration plants fre-
quently matched the economic viability of utility
units and became increasingly popular, even at
their relatively puny scale. Growing from a
small percentage of American electric capacity
in 1980, cogeneration facilities accounted for 39
percent of capacity in 2002 (Electric Power
Supply Association, 2005).
A related provision of PURPA also spurred
research on environmentally preferable tech-
nologies that used water, wind, or solar power to
produce electricity. More successful than anyone
originally anticipated, PURPA prompted work
that cut the cost of power produced by solar
photovoltaic panels by about 70 percent between
1980 and 1995 (Sheer 2001; Clayton 2004).
More significantly, it contributed to work that
lowered the cost of power produced by wind tur-
bines; by 2002, the average cost of wind-pro-
duced electricity dropped to under 5 cents per
kWh, a cost that compared favorably with elec-
tricity produced by conventional utility plants
burning natural gas or coal (Smith 2004;
American Wind Energy Association 2005).
These smaller-scale generation technologies
challenged the established paradigm of the utility
industry (and many other industries) that previ-
ously relied on large-scale equipment to produce
economies of scale. Now, it appeared, power
plants producing modest amounts of electricity
proved economically viable. Moreover, since
they were smaller, they required less time to
build, and they put less capital at risk during 
a period of rapid price inflation. Finally, they
matched the slower growth rate of consumption
more appropriately: with growth rates remaining
under 3 percent per year, consumers needed
smaller increments of power to match their
demand. Had utilities continued to build their
traditional behemoths, huge chunks of power
would remain unused when the plants were 
completed. Small scale, indeed, looked beautiful.
In the parlance of Hughes’s approach, these
small-scale technologies constituted radical
technologies that helped alter the utility system’s
momentum. They did so by enabling competi-
tion for the traditional power companies—at
least in the generation sector—and by eroding
the control held by utility managers. No longer
the sole producers of electricity, power company
executives watched as industrial firms (employing
cogeneration facilities) and renewable energy
entrepreneurs sold competitively priced electricity.
This unintended experiment with competi-
tion suggested to influential regulators and legis-
lators in the 1980s that more competition would
benefit stakeholders in the electric utility indus-
try. (Not coincidentally, competition had already
begun in the airline, telecommunications, and
natural gas industries.) Some academics and
politicians wondered if utility regulation still
had merit, seeing that a traditional justification
of government oversight—the fact that power
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companies constituted natural monopolies—no
longer appeared valid. After all, if nonutilities
could produce power as cheaply as could utili-
ties, then the big power companies no longer
deemed recognition as natural monopolies. And
if they were not natural monopolies, they no
longer deserved special status as noncompetitive
entities that required regulation (Hirsh 1999,
119-142). Why not permit increased competition
to thrive outside the realm of the PURPA-
inspired generation companies?
Already feeling their control of the system
threatened by pressures resulting from imple-
mentation of PURPA, utility managers had more
to fear. After the Gulf War focused attention
again on the cost and security of energy sup-
plies, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of
1992. The legislation sought to employ competi-
tive forces to increase domestic fuel production
and to improve the efficiency of energy use.
One provision gave states the option of opening
up their transmission network to use by competi-
tors. The network would serve as a common car-
rier so any electricity producer could sell power
to any customer. Essentially, the law gave states
the right to begin competition on the retail level.
During the late 1990s, several states (with
California being among the first) passed legisla-
tion that established competitive retail frame-
works for power. By September 2001, 23 states
(and the District of Columbia) had passed simi-
lar legislation, while regulatory bodies in several
other states had reduced their oversight and had
introduced market forces into the system.
The restructuring process, stimulated by
PURPA and pursued by advocates of market
forces, meant that momentum in the utility 
system had been altered, largely because utility
managers lost control of “their” system. For
almost a century, managers commanded the
huge-scale, incrementally improving conserva-
tive technologies that produced and distributed
electricity. But in recent decades, they began
facing competition from entrepreneurial compa-
nies that employed small-scale fossil fuel and
renewable energy technologies. In 1992, nonutil-
ity companies controlled 1.5 percent of the
nation’s total power capacity; that number rose
to 34.7 percent in 2003 (U.S. Department of
Energy, 2005b). In addition, power company
managers lost the benefit of traditional regula-
tion, which protected companies from competi-
tion on the basis of their claim—now chal-
lenged—to natural monopoly status. At the same
time, managers lost support from those stake-
holders who previously buttressed them: finan-
ciers, equipment manufacturers, and educational
institutions adapted to the changing environment
and found new opportunities serving the needs
of the growing number of nonutility companies.
Employing the terms of the systems approach,
then, the sociotechnical elements that had previ-
ously contributed to utility system momentum
no longer had the same speed nor direction.
Assuming some of the political and eco-
nomic power that managers once held, other
stakeholders began making new waves.
Environmental advocates, for example, gained
impressive standing in the legislative process
that led to creation of restructuring laws. While
supporting deregulation in general, they fought
for (and in many cases won) provisions in laws
that guaranteed funding for renewable energy
and energy-efficiency initiatives. In California’s
version of restructuring, for example, utilities
earned the right to receive payment from cus-
tomers for building what turned out to be expen-
sive power plants during the era of regulation,
but which would have little economic value in
an era of competition (called “stranded” assets).
But environmental advocates won provision for
expenditures on energy efficiency work, renew-
able energy technologies, and for development
of research on new technologies that had not yet
shown commercial viability (Hirsh 1999, 258).
The Promise of Decentralized
Electricity Generation
As stakeholders began renegotiating their
positions in an altered utility system, the
California electricity crisis of 2000 and 2001
created a sense of chaos. Subsequent blackouts
in the Midwest during 2002 and in the Northeast
and Canada during 2003 contributed further to
that disharmony. In California, where one utility
declared bankruptcy as a result of the crisis, the
state suspended competition altogether and
expanded its control of the wholesale market.
Such events caused policy makers in other states
to reconsider their previous enthusiasm for
restructuring and to slow down plans to intro-
duce market forces. At the same time, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission pro-
posed new initiatives in response to the 2003
blackout that may give it greater control over the
increasingly fragile-looking transmission grid.
That grid has witnessed serious underinvestment
since the 1990s as utility companies and nonutil-
ity entrepreneurs remained concerned in an
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uncertain policy setting about how the grid will
be employed and which stakeholders will profit
from its use (Rigby 2003).
The unsettled state of affairs in the power
system has provided opportunities for advocates
of environmentally-friendly and distributed-gen-
eration technologies. Taking advantage of the
flux within the utility system, especially in
states with strong traditions of politically astute
environmental advocates, activists won passage
of laws for funding of renewable energy and
small-scale generation technologies. Customers
paid into “public benefit funds” (also known as
“system benefit funds”) regardless of which
company (a traditional utility or nonutility com-
pany) provided them with electricity (Clean
Energy States Alliance, 2004). And in eighteen
states (plus the District of Columbia), advocates
convinced legislators to enact laws creating
“renewable portfolio standards” that required all
competitive power companies to produce (or to
purchase) a certain amount of power coming
from small-scale, renewable resources. The laws
created a market for environmentally preferable
technologies and spurred research and develop-
ment of them so they become more economical-
ly viable even without government incentives. In
Texas, a law (signed by Governor George W.
Bush in 1999) required 2,000 MW of renewable
energy to be constructed by 2009 (Wiser and
Langiss, 2001). By the end of 2004, producers
had already installed 1,293 MW, most of it con-
sisting of competitively priced wind turbines
(Garman 2005).
The state-supported move toward small-
scale generation technologies reflects the ero-
sion of the conventional paradigm of providing
power through large, centralized power genera-
tors. Traditionally, policymakers emphasized
using the discipline of power engineering to
focus on expanding generating capacity to meet
aggregated demand at the lowest cost. This
approach relied on large plants because utility
managers believed that bigger facilities offered
lower fixed costs and were better driven by
economies of scale (Capehart, Mehta, and
Turner 2003; Lovins et al. 2002).
By contrast, an emerging paradigm of dis-
tributed generation emphasizes decentralized,
modular, and on-site production of electricity.
Proponents of DG argue that small, local plants
(often having capacities of between 5 and 30
MW) are frequently less expensive, more effi-
cient, more reliable, more flexible, and less
damaging to the environment than large utility-
owned power plants that burn fossil fuels. Since
many renewable energy technologies—such as
wind turbines and photovoltaic systems—are
smaller and decentralized, they serve as exam-
ples of DG technologies. Even generation equip-
ment that employs fossil fuels, such as natural
gas and coal, can be considered valuable DG
resources, especially when they exploit waste
heat generated through combustion or fuel con-
version. These comprise cogeneration plants
(also known as combined heat and power [CHP]
facilities) like those encouraged by PURPA.
They may also include very small steam tur-
bines known as micro-turbines that produce
power in the range of 25 to 500 kW while also
recycling waste steam for water or space heating
needs (Capehart 2003). Phosphoric acid fuel
cells have become popular too. Being pursued
by public benefit funding programs in some
states, the devices (which are being tested in 200
kW to 11 MW sizes) take in hydrogen-rich fuel
and create electricity through a chemical process
rather than by combustion, yielding few particu-
late wastes (Yacobucci and Cutright, 2004). The
process also generates heat, which can be used
as a profitable by-product. Beyond these DG
technologies that offer high efficiencies are
modular internal combustion engines that run on
diesel fuel or gasoline. In their smallest incarna-
tions (about 1 kW), they provide backup power
for homes and recreational vehicles. In larger
increments, they supply power for hospitals and
commercial venues. Generally speaking, DG
technologies can be employed in isolated
“islands”—independent of the transmission
grid—or attached to it, in which case they serve
as small power units that contribute power to it.
Consumer advocates who favor DG point
out that distributed resources can improve the
efficiency of providing electric power. They
often highlight that transmission of electricity
from a power plant to a typical user wastes
roughly 4.2 to 8.9 percent of the electricity as a
consequence of aging transmission equipment,
inconsistent enforcement of reliability guide-
lines, and growing congestion (Silberglitt,
Ettedgui, and Hove 2002; Lovins 2002). At the
same time, customers often suffer from poor
power quality—variations in voltage or electrical
flow—that results from a variety of factors,
including poor switching operations in the net-
work, voltage dips, interruptions, transients, and
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network disturbances from loads. Overall, DG
proponents highlight the inefficiency of the
existing large-scale electrical transmission and
distribution network. Moreover, because cus-
tomers’ electricity bills include the cost of this
vast transmission grid, the use of on-site power
equipment can conceivably provide consumers
with affordable power at a higher level of quali-
ty. In addition, residents and businesses that
generate power locally have the potential to sell
surplus power to the grid, which can yield sig-
nificant income during times of peak demand.
Industrial managers and contractors have
also begun to emphasize the advantages of gen-
erating power on site. Cogeneration technologies
permit businesses to reuse thermal energy that
would normally be wasted. They have therefore
become prized in industries that use large quan-
tities of heat, such as the iron and steel, chemi-
cal processing, refining, pulp and paper manu-
facturing, and food processing industries
(International Energy Association 2002, 41-49).
Similar generation hardware can also deploy
recycled heat to provide hot water for use in
aquaculture, greenhouse heating, desalination of
seawater, increased crop growth and frost pro-
tection, and air preheating (Kleinbach and
Hinrichs 2002, 311).
Beyond efficiency, DG technologies may
provide benefits in the form of more reliable
power for industries that require uninterrupted
service. The Electric Power Research Institute
reported that power outages and quality distur-
bances cost American businesses $119 billion
per year (Hinrichs, Conbere, and Lobash 2002).
In 2001, the International Energy Agency (2002)
estimated that the average cost of a one-hour
power outage was $6,480,000 for brokerage
operations and $2,580,000 for credit card opera-
tions (44). The figures grow more impressively
for the semiconductor industry, where a two-
hour power outage can cost close to $48,000,000
(Lin 2004). Given these numbers, it remains 
no mystery why several firms have already
installed DG facilities to ensure consistent
power supplies.
Perhaps incongruously, DG facilities offer
potential advantages for improving the transmis-
sion of power. Because they produce power
locally for users, they aid the entire grid by
reducing demand during peak times and by min-
imizing congestion of power on the network,
one of the causes of the 2003 blackout
(Congressional Budget Office 2003). And by
building large numbers of localized power gen-
eration facilities rather than a few large-scale
power plants located distantly from load centers,
DG can contribute to deferring transmission
upgrades and expansions—at a time when
investment in such facilities remains constrained
(International Energy Agency 2002; Pepermans
2003). Perhaps most important in the post-
September 11 era, DG technologies may
improve the security of the grid. Decentralized
power generation helps reduce the terrorist tar-
gets that nuclear facilities and natural gas
refineries offer, and—in the event of an attack—
better insulate the grid from failure if a large
power plant goes down (Friedman and Homer-
Dixon 2004).
Environmentalists and academics suggest
that DG technologies can provide ancillary ben-
efits to society. Large, centralized power plants
emit significant amounts of carbon monoxide,
sulfur oxides, particulate matter, hydrocarbons,
and nitrogen oxides (Kleinbach and Hinrichs
2002, 249). The Environmental Protection
Agency has long noted the correlation between
high levels of sulfur oxide emissions and the
creation of acid rain. Because they concentrate
the amount of power they produce, large power
plants also focus their pollution and waste heat,
frequently destroying aquatic habitats and
marine biodiversity (Kleinbach and Hinrichs
2002, 307-308). On the other hand, recent stud-
ies have confirmed that widespread use of DG
technologies substantially reduces emissions: A
British analysis estimated that domestic com-
bined heat and power technologies reduced car-
bon dioxide emissions by 41 percent in 1999; a
similar report on the Danish power system
observed that widespread use of DG technolo-
gies have cut emissions by 30 percent from 1998
to 2001 (International Energy Association 2002,
92). Moreover, because DG technologies remain
independent of the grid, they can provide emer-
gency power for a huge number of public servic-
es, such as hospitals, schools, airports, fire and
police stations, military bases, prisons, water
supply and sewage treatment plants, natural gas
transmission and distribution systems, and com-
munications stations (Liss 1999). Finally, DG
can help the nation increase its diversity of ener-
gy sources. Some of the DG technologies, such
as wind turbines, solar photovoltaic panels, and
hydroelectric turbines, consume no fossil fuels,
while others, such as fuel cells, microturbines,
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and some internal combustion units burn natural
gas, much of which is produced in the United
States. The increasing diversity helps insulate
the economy from price shocks, interruptions,
and fuel shortages (Herzog, Lipman, and
Edwards 2001).
Although estimates vary, total-customer
owned generation of distributed resources
remains comparatively small, although it is
expected to grow rapidly. The Energy
Information Administration classified only 0.5
percent of electricity generation in 2000 as
“nonutility” generation while noting that cogen-
eration systems in industrial sectors produced
3.6 percent of electricity for their own use
(Congressional Budget Office 2003). However,
an Electric Utility Consultants (2004) study con-
cluded that distributed generation units—classi-
fied as decentralized generators between 1 and
60 MW—provide an aggregate capacity of 234
gigawatts (GW) through approximately 12.3
million units. (The total capacity of American
power plants in 2003 was 948 GW). The
American Gas Association (2000), meanwhile,
predicted that renewable energy technologies
will provide over 15 percent of electricity in the
United States by 2020, and the U.S. Department
of Energy’s Energy Information Administration
(2000) projected that distributed generation
technologies will likely surpass 25 percent of
electricity generation by the same year.
Regardless of these projections, proponents
of distributed generation caution that DG tech-
nologies are not designed or intended to replace
the power grid. The United States Combined
Heat and Power Association notes that DG facil-
ities could not reliably serve as substitutes for
all large, centralized power plants since they
cannot meet all customers’ needs (especially
customers in urban areas with severe land, per-
mitting, and citing constraints) (Fallek 2004).
The American Wind Energy Association (2004)
adds that wind turbines will primarily augment,
rather than replace, the grid.
As compelling as DG appears, the transition
to a new paradigm that employs it widely will
not necessarily occur smoothly due to a host of
social, technical, and political impediments. By
far the largest social constraint consists of the
belief that renewable energy systems and decen-
tralized units have higher operating costs than
large centralized facilities. As a result, many
policymakers and consumers believe that renew-
able technologies have not become cost compet-
itive with traditional fossil fuel sources of elec-
tricity (Pepermans 2003; Colorado Renewable
Energy Society 2002). In addition, the financial
payback period for renewable energy systems
still appears too long for fiscally conservative
customers. Businesses often look for two to
three year timeframes for obtaining a positive
cash flow after making capital investments. Yet
wind turbines require about six to nine years for
payback, and their installation sometimes suffers
from long project lead times, lack of suitable
service infrastructure, and poorly developed
sales channels (Rendon 2003; Liss 1999).
The biggest technical impediment consists
of connecting DG technologies to the grid. This
interconnection challenge really constitutes a set
of related smaller problems: voltage control
(keeping voltages within a certain range), the
balancing of reactive power (using power to reg-
ulate the flow of alternating current to maintain
proper grid synchronization), and safety (ensur-
ing the adequate protection of people working
on the grid) (International Energy Agency 2002,
73-75). Currently, those using DG technologies
often depend on custom-designed electronics
packages to solve these problems. The great
expense in developing such packages obviously
creates a disincentive for new users (Ostergaard
2003; Pepermans 2003).
Perhaps more significant are the challenges
relating to regulatory and political inertia within
the United States. Lingering monopoly rules and
discriminatory rate structures still create politi-
cal obstacles towards investing in DG technolo-
gies. Customers who seek to use DG often face
high exit fees imposed by utilities that seek to
recover stranded costs. Further giving an unfair
advantage to existing producers, utilities and
other owners of old coal-fired power plants have
won exemption from 1970 Clean Air Act. These
“grandfathered” plants can often operate more
cheaply than any type of new generation tech-
nology. They therefore enjoy an artificial advan-
tage over some DG technologies, which must
meet current and future environmental standards
(Casten 1998, 203; Meyer 2003).
Conclusion
The tentative move toward DG represents 
a somewhat paradoxical return to the electric
utility industry’s roots. Thomas Edison inaugu-
rated the industry in 1882 when he supplied
direct-current (DC) power to a host of nearby
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businesses in the financial district of New York.
Because DC power could not be transmitted
over long distances, Edison hoped to sell small-
scale generation equipment to commercial cus-
tomers (such as hotels and industrial firms) that
had large demands for electricity. Individual
homeowners would be served by small power
stations like Edison’s original, which would be
dotted throughout cities at regular intervals. This
model, of course, became displaced by one that
employed large centralized power stations to
create huge amounts of power sent over alternat-
ing-current transmission networks. Overcoming
the problem of limited distance distribution
posed by Edison’s DC arrangement, the AC
approach lent itself better to the economies of
scale that became apparent in generating equip-
ment over the next eight decades.
But even consideration of a return to the 
use of distributed generation resources high-
lights the significant change in momentum that
has occurred within the electric power system.
Unlike in the period from the early twentieth
century to the 1970s, the technological basis for
the system remains in flux today: large-scale
generation and transmission technologies no
longer offer prized economic benefits, and they
recently have begun to be seen as security and
reliability threats to a society that increasingly
depends on electricity. The experience contains
parallels with other industries that once valued
large scale. In the steel, biotechnology, agricul-
ture, microelectronics, pharmaceutical, and 
mining industries, companies have recently
employed small-scale technologies to gain
increased flexibility, security, and lower costs.
The utility system’s momentum has been
altered by more than the shift away from tradi-
tional large-scale technologies. It has also been
changed by those who wield economic and
political power. As utility managers lost the ben-
efit of state regulation, which previously guaran-
teed their companies’ status as natural monopo-
lies, they found themselves competing with
entrepreneurs who employed small-scale tech-
nologies. Simultaneously, other supporting
stakeholders (i.e., financiers, equipment suppli-
ers, academic institutions, and politicians) aban-
doned their former allies, realizing that they
could benefit from making alliances with new
players in the system. As utility managers lost
control over the system, new players, such as
environmental advocates and policy makers,
sought to advance their own (and different)
visions of a utility paradigm. During the chaotic
first years of the twenty-first century, the old
and new stakeholders have not yet reached con-
sensus for a new paradigm for the utility system.
In such an untidy environment, advocates of dis-
tributed-generation technologies have seen
opportunities to redirect the system’s momentum.
If nothing else, this study of the American
electric utility system demonstrates that systems
with momentum do not carry that momentum
indefinitely. Evolving systems are not, as
Hughes (1983) pointed out, “driverless vehicles
carrying society to destinations unknown and
perhaps undesired” (462). Rather, human stake-
holders play important roles in channeling
momentum. Though they may not always realize
the consequences of their actions—contributing
to forces that alter momentum in unanticipated
ways—people remain at the core of technologi-
cal systems because of their concern for politi-
cal control, influence, money, and power. This
conclusion suggests the value of the systems
approach for teaching about technology and
society in school at several levels. In particular,
the approach reveals the subtle and explicit
interdependency of hardware and nontechnical
elements in modern society.
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